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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Encoding Security Policies as Refinement Types for Database Applications
by
Sourav Anand
Master of Science in Computer Science
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Nadia Polikarpova, Chair
This thesis presents an encoding of security policies for database-backed web applications
as refinement types. We add refinement types to the function calls which interact directly with
the database in order to attach a label to the output data. Any computation over the data retrieved
from the database also requires computing a new label as per the refinement types added to the
computation to enforce the security policies. The label on the data is verified against the security
policies at the point where data is being displayed to a viewer. The refinement types are verified
statically with LiquidHaskell which allows programmers to reason about the enforcement of the
security policies across the whole application.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent years have seen an exponential increase in the number of web applications. Broad
availability of the internet and the growing popularity for cloud computing has been an important
aspect towards this growth. In order to provide a seamless and rich experience, these applications
store and perform computations on user data, including private and sensitive information. Such
information should not be leaked to unauthorized users because of bugs in the application.
Programmers decide specific policies regarding the access and visibility of data and add various
checks in the application to enforce these policies.
Programmers write test cases along with their desired output to test the functionality
of web application. This also includes the tests required for verifying the enforcement of the
security policy across the web application. This is a manual method and is often infeasible to
write test cases for all of the possible data flow paths across the whole application. It is often the
case that applications, especially the large ones have a control flow path which doesn’t have the
policies enforced. An attacker can use this to access private data of the users.
Static information flow control techniques [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] attempt to verify the applica-
tions against the security policies decided by the programmers. However, these techniques are
not expressive enough and do not support many real-world policies. Lifty [7] introduces a static
information flow control technique which allows the programmers to verify expressive security
policies across a whole application written in the Lifty toy language.
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However, data handling in the Lifty toy language is different than the real world databases
used by web applications. The main difference is that Lifty accesses each data fields individually,
whereas, databases use query language to return all of the resulting data at once, which presents
additional challenges when attempting to write refinement types for the data retrieval API. We
look into the encoding of security policies used by Lifty and define a similar encoding for
applications which use databases. Our database API is based on the Persistent library, a part of
the Yesod Web Framework, which provides a query style API.
This thesis presents an API library which wraps the database access functions used by
Yesod and adds refinement types to those functions which contain the security policies. We also
adopt the Tagged monad based computation used in Lifty and all of the functions in the API
library performs computation in the Tagged monad and appropriately labels the monad. The
label is checked against the privileges of the users to which the data is being displayed. The main
contribution of this thesis is the refinement types for the database API which correctly assign
security label to values read from the database and enforce the security policy.
2
Chapter 2
Motivating Example
In this section, we discuss an example web application named Todo. The application
is a simple todo list which allows users to add tasks and also allows them to share their entire
list with other users. The security policy on the visibility of tasks can be broken down into the
following two distinct policies.
P1. Users should be able to see all of the tasks created by them.
P2. User a should be able to see the tasks of User b only if User b has shared their tasks with
User a.
The above policies are formalized with respect to the eventual viewer, which depends
on how the data is displayed. Todo has two different methods of displaying data to users. The
first method is to display the tasks to the logged-in user and the second method is a daily email
update which is automatically sent to users showing the new tasks shared with them during the
previous day. Enforcing security policies for these display actions means that the logged in user
should only see their own tasks and the tasks shared with them, and the email update should only
contain information which is visible to the receiver of the email.
2.1 Database Structure
The database design of the the Todo application consists of three tables: User, TodoItem
and SharedItem, represented in Figure 2.1. The application is architected such that users are
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added to the User table when they log in for the first time, tasks are added to the TodoItem table
when a logged-in user adds a task and an entry is added to the SharedItem table when a user
shares their list with another user.
The Todo application has a security policy on the Task field of the TodoItem table which
allows the Task field to be displayed to a viewer only if they are the owner of that task or the
owner has shared their list with them. A security policy is a function of two arguments, the row
r and the viewer v. The policy has to be enforced for each row r present in the TodoItem table
with respect to the viewer v. The policy annotated for the Task field in Figure 2.1 is a disjunction
of two subexpressions, the first one stating that UserId of v is the same as the Owner field of r
(Policy P1) and the second one stating that there exists a row in the SharedItem table indicating
that the Owner of r has shared their list with the viewer v (Policy P2).
We will discuss the security policies with respect to the database snapshot of the appli-
cation shown in Figure 2.2. The snapshot contains 3 users: Alice, Bob and Eve, along with
the tasks added by them. The SharedItem table shows that Alice has shared their list with Bob
and Bob has shared theirs with both Alice and Eve. The security policies, if enforced correctly,
should allow Alice and Bob to access their own tasks and the tasks of each other and it should
allow Eve to access their own tasks along with the tasks of Bob. No other accesses should be
allowed by the application.
2.2 Security Policies
We categorize the policies on a field into two types: local policies and global policies. A
policy on a field of row r is local if it depends only on the data from r. Such policies can be
easily verified when a row and viewer are provided. Global policies, on the other hand, depend
on more information than the current row and the viewer. The dependencies of global policies
can also span across multiple tables of the databases. It is more difficult to verify such policies
as a global context is required.
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User
UserName UserId
TodoItem
Owner
SharedItem
SharedTo SharedFrom
\r v -> UserId v== Owner r || 
                SharedItem { SharedTo = UserId v, SharedFrom = Owner r}∃
Task
Figure 2.1. The database model along with the policy annotation for the Task field of the
TodoItem table
User TodoItem SharedItem
UserName UserId Task Owner SharedTo SharedFrom
Alice 1 Write Thesis 1 2 1
Bob 2 Cook 2 1 2
Eve 3 Book Flights 1 3 2
Figure 2.2. The database Snapshot containing 3 users and their tasks. Alice shares their list with
Bob and Bob shares it with both Alice and Eve
We can see from the database model for the Todo application from Figure 2.1 that Task
field has a policy consisting of a disjunction whose subexpressions can be categorized into local
policy and global policy. Policy P1 depends on the row and the viewer and hence it is a local
policy. Policy P2 has a requirement on the SharedItem table and hence it is a global policy.
We will discuss how to handle these two types of policies separately with example client code
written in Yesod.
2.3 Yesod API example
We will follow the database API used in Yesod to discuss the client code. Figure 2.3
shows a sample function call which takes a UserId u as input and displays the tasks of rows
from TodoItem table which have the Owner set to u. Yesod API provides the selectList
function which takes a list of filter conditions as input and computes an output list of rows which
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1 displayOwnedBy u = renderHTML (do
2 rows <- selectList [TodoItemOwner ==. userId u]
3 tasks <- projectTask rows
4 return (show tasks)
5 )
6
7 projectTask [] = []
8 projectTask x:xs = (task x):( projectTask xs)
Figure 2.3. Sample function call in Yesod which selects the rows from TodoItem table for
which the Owner is same as the input u, and then displays the task from the selected rows to the
logged-in user
1 searchTask t = renderHTML (do
2 rows <- selectList [TodoItemTask ==. t]
3 owners <- projectOwners rows
4 return (show owners)
5 )
6
7 projectOwners [] = []
8 projectOwners x:xs = (owner x):( projectOwners xs)
Figure 2.4. Sample function call in Yesod which selects the rows from TodoItem table for which
the Task is same as the task t, and displays the owner from the selected rows to the logged-in
user.
satisfy the given filter conditions. projectTask is a simple function which takes a list of rows
and generates a new list containing only the Task field from the input. Finally, renderHTML
function displays the tasks to the logged-in user.
2.4 Local Policies
Local policies are easier to enforce as they usually only require the programmer to add
simple if checks in the code. We discussed that Policy P1 is a local policy and now we will see
how we can enforce it.
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1 displayOwnedBy u = renderHTML (do
2 rows <- selectList [TodoItemOwner ==. userId u]
3 tasks <- projectTask rows
4 return (show tasks)
5 )
6
7 projectTask [] = []
8 projectTask x:xs = if owner x == userId loggedInUser
9 then (task x):( projectTask xs)
10 else projectTask xs
Figure 2.5. The client code containing the if condition in the projectTask function which matches
the userId of the logged-in user to the Owner of the task before adding the task from a row to the
output list
2.4.1 Projecting a sensitive field
We will first examine the sample client code shown in Figure 2.3. The client code
retrieves the rows owned by user u and displays their tasks to the logged-in user. Owner is a
public field and hence filtering on it does not reveal any sensitive information. However, Task is
a sensitive field and the client code projects the Task field and displays it to the logged-in user.
The code does not place any checks on the input provided to the function displayOwnedBy
and hence does not satisfy the policy P1 (we will discuss about P2 in later sections). The input
u can be anything, so it might display the logged-in user the tasks from other users which
would violate policy P1. In order to fix this, the programmer needs to add an if condition in the
projectTask function which compares the owner of the row with the logged-in user before
projecting the task field of that row.
Figure 2.5 shows the client code with additional check in the function projectTask
which makes sure that the function returns Tasks of only those rows whose Owner is the same as
loggedInUser . This forces the input u to displyOwnedBy function to be the userId of
the loggedInUser in order to view any task. This will enforce policy P1 as it will allow only
those tasks to be displayed which are owned by the loggedInUser .
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1 searchTask t = renderHTML (do
2 rows <- selectList [TodoItemTask ==. t,
3 TodoItemOwner ==. userId loggedInUser]
4 owners <- projectOwners rows
5 return (show owners)
6 )
Figure 2.6. The client code containing the extra filter in the selectList function call which selects
the rows from TodoItem table for which the userId of the logged-in user is the same as the Owner
of the task and the Task is the same as the input task t, and displays the owners from the selected
rows
2.4.2 Filtering on a sensitive field
Figure 2.4 shows client code where the filter is done directly on a sensitive field and
a public field is projected which is eventually displayed to the logged-in user. Even though
the code is displaying a public field, it violates the policy P1 because it is indirectly leaking
information of the users who have a specific task in their todo list. Policy P1 states that only the
owner should be able to view the Task field and hence the programmer needs to add checks in
the client code to enforce this indirect leak of the task information.
P1 can again be enforced by adding checks in the projectOwners function but it is
slightly counter-intuitive since owner is a public field. We will look into another way to enforce
this policy where the programmers add an extra filter in the selectList API call to contain
only those rows in output which satisfy the policy P1. Figure 2.6 shows the fixed client code
which has an extra filter in line 2 forcing the API to select only those rows whose Owner is same
as the userId of loggedInUser . This additional filter will enforce the policy P1 as it will
select only those tasks which are owned by the loggedInUser .
2.5 Global Policies
Global policies are harder to enforce as compared to local policies as they are dependent
on data beyond what is being selected. In the Todo app, we saw that policy P2 is a global policy.
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In previous section, the client code allowed the loggedInUser to display the tasks owned
by them and we saw how various checks helped enforce policy P1. Todo also allows users to
display the tasks owned by a different user but shared with them. A programmer can again use
the function shown in Figure 2.3 to display the tasks owned by user u, but now we would like to
see the tasks shared with the loggedInUser , which is allowed by P2. Enforcing policy P2
can be tricky as it requires checking the existence of a particular row in a different table. The
programmer must first select the data from the SharedItem table and then select the data from
TodoItem table based on the output of previous query, to satisfy the policy.
Figure 2.7 shows the sample client code which enforces policy P2. The function
displaySharedTasks first select the rows from SharedItem table which have the Shared-
ItemTo field equal to the UserId of the loggedInUser and is stored into sharedItems .
The next step calls projectSharedFrom on sharedItems which generates a list of users
who have shared their tasks with the loggedInUser and stores that in sharedFromList .
This list is then used as the parameter of selectList in line 4 which selects a row from
TodoItem table only if the Owner of a row is in sharedFromList . Finally, the Task field of
the rows returned from the selectList function is projected using the function projectTasks
and displayed to the viewer. This client code enforces policy P2 as only those Tasks are retrieved
from the database which are shared with the loggedInUser .
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1 displaySharedTasks = renderHTML (do
2 sharedItems <- selectList [SharedItemSharedTo ==.
userId loggedInUser]
3 sharedFromList <- projectSharedFrom sharedItems
4 todoItems <- selectList [TodoItemOwner <-.
sharedFromList]
5 tasks <- projectTasks todoItems
6 return (show tasks)
7 )
8
9 projectSharedFrom [] = []
10 projectSharedFrom (x:xs) = (sharedFrom x):(
projectSharedFrom xs)
11
12 projectTask [] = []
13 projectTask x:xs = (task x):( projectTask xs)
Figure 2.7. Function call to display todoItems owned by the users who have shared it with the
logged-in user
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Chapter 3
Background
3.1 Yesod
Yesod [8] is a web application framework which allows programmers to write database-
backed web applications in Haskell. It uses the Persistent library to interact with the database of
the application via SQL style queries. Writing the web application in a strongly typed language
provides a lot of benefits and helps avoid many common bugs. However, type safety only
guarantees that the functions written in the application are well formed and does not provide
security guarantees.
3.2 Liquid Haskell
Liquid Haskell [9] (LH) is a refinement type checker for Haskell. It allows programmers
to define refinement types for various functions which allows them to define the exact require-
ments on the inputs and outputs of the functions. LH checks the complete source code statically
and verifies it with respect to the predicates defined in refinement types. LH allows programmers
to precisely encode the predicates on the inputs and outputs of a function which allows them to
verify even complex properties attached to the functions.
11
1 {-@ data Tagged a <p :: User -> Bool > = Tagged { content ::
a } @-}
2 data Tagged a = Tagged { content :: a }
3 deriving Eq
4
5 {-@ data variance Tagged covariant contravariant @-}
Figure 3.1. The data definition of Tagged along with its refinement type
3.3 Lifty
Lifty is a toy language which allows programmers to write secure web applications.
It encodes security policies of the database and statically verifies the application against the
policies. The application uses a Tagged monad which carries a label specifying the accessibility
information for the data inside the monad and verifies the application based on the label and the
viewer accessing the data. Lifty also provides the ability to automatically synthesize patches for
security loopholes in the programs.
3.3.1 Tagged monad
Lifty combined the idea of security monads [10, 11] with dependent labels, which are
predicates parameterized by the viewer derived from the security policies on the data stored
inside the monad. The monad is initialized with the data retrieved from the database and assigned
the label based on the policy associated with the database call. Any further computation on that
data will bind the policy based on the computation being performed and the label will be updated
accordingly.
We implemented the Tagged monad in a similar way as it is done in Lifty. Figure
3.1 is the definition is the Tagged type. The refinement type of Tagged contains an abstract
refinement p which acts as the label for the Tagged monad. This label is a predicate parame-
terized by the viewer. The label determines if a viewer v is allowed to view the data inside the
monad. For example, the label v-> True means that everyone is allowed to view the data,
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1 {-@ instance Monad Tagged where
2 >>= :: forall <p :: User -> Bool >.
3 x:Tagged <p> a
4 -> (u:a -> Tagged <p> b
5 -> Tagged <p> b;
6 >> :: forall <p :: User -> Bool >.
7 x:Tagged <{\v -> false}> a
8 -> Tagged <p> b
9 -> Tagged <p> b;
10 return :: a -> Tagged <{\v -> true}> a
11 @-}
Figure 3.2. Refinement type for the functions of Tagged which which help in the mainintaing
the security policy by updating the label
v->UserId v == 1 means that only the user with UserId equal to 1 is allowed to see the
data and finally, and v->False means that no one is allowed to see the data inside the monad.
The variance property of the Tagged monad as shown in line number 5 states that the
last parameter, i.e. the abstract refinement p, is contravariant. This is because having the label
set to True means that every user is able to see the data, and as we move away from True to
False, the policy gets more restrictive. Logically, this means that Tagged<True> a <: Tagged
<False> a. Since this property of the label p is opposite from the general notion that False is a
subtype of True, we mark Tagged as contravariant in p.
Figure 3.2 is the definitions of the monad instance for Tagged . The return functions
takes a value of type a and returns a Tagged a with the label set to True. This is because a
is just a constant value which has no security policy and hence it is safe to make it visible to
everyone.
The bind operator (>>=) is the most important function for the Tagged monad as it
is responsible for combining sensitive computations and properly propagating their labels. It
takes two inputs, a Tagged a and a function a -> Tagged b and outputs a Tagged b.
The label of Tagged is the same abstract refinement term p in each of Tagged monads. This
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means that the final label p on the output should be at least as strong as both the label on the
input Tagged a and the label added by the computation done by the input using the function
a -> Tagged b.
The refinement type for the function >> states that it takes a Tagged a and Tagged b
as input and outputs the second parameter. This function discards the result of previous computa-
tion and hence the output label of >> is the same as that of the second parameter. The first input
has a label v-> false attached to it and it makes sure that any label attached to the first input
is valid as all of the types are a sub-type of False as Tagged is contravariant in p .
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Chapter 4
Encodings of security policies
In this chapter, we will discuss the database API along with the encoding of their
refinement types which allows LH to verify the application with respect to the security policies.
We will follow the database model of the Todo app (discussed in Chapter 2) to explain the
refinement types added to the database API.
We had to write the selectList API for each table separately along with separate
filter functions for each field. This was done to correctly encode the refinements which can
be verified, keeping in mind LH’s limitations. We will first discuss how local policies can be
encoded and then will extend it to add support for global policies. Also, we will focus on just the
encoding of the refinement types for the API and will not go into the implementation details of
the API functions.
The main goal of refinement types is to infer the appropriate label regarding the user
who can access the data and attach it to the Tagged monad containing the output data. The
advantage of using the Tagged monad is that we can write the functions which displays the data
from the Tagged monad to a viewer along with its refinement type that contains the predicate
describing the viewer. LH will be able to verify if the viewer has the required permission when
compared to the label attached to the Tagged monad passed as input.
Figure 4.1 shows an example function which takes a Tagged monad as input and dis-
plays its content to the currently logged in user. The refinement type added to the renderHTML
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1 {-@ renderHTML :: Tagged <{\v-> UserId v == UserId
loggedInUser}> a-> ()@-}
2 renderHTML :: Tagged a -> ()
Figure 4.1. A sample function which takes a Tagged monad as input and renders an HTML page
for the logged in User
function states that the input to the function should be a sub-type of Tagged <{\v->UserId v
== UserId loggedInUser}>. LH will verify the application only when all of the calls to the
renderHTML function have the label of the Tagged monad as a subtype of the required label.
We saw how the Tagged monad and refinement types can be helpful in enforcing the
policy with respect to the eventual viewer of the data. We just need to make sure that the
Tagged monad is assigned an appropriate label, and we can rely on LH to verify that the
policies are being enforced. We will now look into the encoding of the API functions and focus
on how the refinement types assign a correct label to the Tagged monad which satisfies the
security policies.
4.1 Filters
Yesod allows programmers to add filter conditions as the parameter to the selectList
function. It is hard to define a generic refinement type which can encompass all possible filters.
We can see from Figure 2.1 that the policies are attached to the specific fields of a table and also
that the filter added to the database call in Figure 2.3 also depends on an individual field. This
motivated us to encode the policies in the filter functions for various fields.
We implemented a new data type RefinedFilter , which allows us to attach the filter
along with the policy for a field. Figure 4.2 shows the refinement type for RefinedFilter
which is parametric over record defining the type of the item on which the filter will be applied
(example, TodoItem for Todo app). It also defines two predicates (abstract refinements) r and q.
The predicate r is of the type record -> Bool which corresponds to the post-condition of
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1 {-@ data RefinedFilter record <r :: record -> Bool ,
2 q :: record -> User -> Bool > = _ @-}
3
4 {-@ data variance RefinedFilter covariant covariant
5 contravariant@ -}
Figure 4.2. Refinement type for the data type RefinedFilter
1
2 {-@ filterTodoItemOwner_EQ :: val: UserId -> RefinedFilter
3 <{\row -> Owner row == val}, {\row v -> True }>
4 TodoItem
5 @-}
6
7 {-@ filterTodoItemTask_EQ :: val: String -> RefinedFilter
8 <{\row -> Task row == val}, {\row v -> Owner row ==
UserId v }>
9 TodoItem
10 @-}
Figure 4.3. Refinement type for the filter functions on the Owner and the Task field of TodoItem
table.
the filter. The predicate q has the type record -> User -> Bool , and corresponds to the
security policy on the field and is responsible for deciding the policy p for the Tagged monad.
We can also see that the variance property of RefinedFilter marks the last parameter (the
predicate q) contravariant. This is required because q represents the policy and hence follows
the contravariance property of the label p attached to the Tagged monad.
We use the RefinedFilter data type to define various filters for the different fields
of the tables. We use the predicates associated with the data type to encode the post-condition
of the filter and the policy on the field. Figure 4.3 shows filterTodoItemOwner_EQ
and filterTodoItemTask_EQ which are filters over the Owner and the Task field of
the TodoItem table respectively. filterTodoItemOwner_EQ defines a filter over the
Owner field which takes a UserId val as input and outputs a RefinedFilter where the
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1 {-@selectTodoItem :: forall <q :: TodoItem -> User -> Bool ,
2 r :: TodoItem -> Bool , p :: User -> Bool >.
3 {row :: TodoItem <r> |- User <p> <: User <q row >}
4 RefinedFilter <r, q> TodoItem -> Tagged <p> [TodoItem <r>]
5 @-}
Figure 4.4. Refinement type for selectTodoItem which uses RefinedFilter TodoItem to retrieve
TodoItems from the database
predicate r states that the filter select the rows whose Owner field is the same as val and
q states that the policy on viewing the Owner field allows it to be displayed to everyone.
filterTodoItemTask_EQ defines a filter over the Task field which takes a String val as
input and outputs a RefinedFilter where the predicate r states that the filter selects the
rows whose Task field is the same as val and q states that the policy on viewing the Task field
restricts it to be displayed only to the owners of the task. This predicate q attaches the local
policy P1 to the filter on the Task field.
The filters shown in Figure 4.3 are two of the many filters which are added in the API.
We need to add filters for all of the fields with appropriate definitions of the predicates r and q.
The filter function do not perform any select action from the database and are meant to be used
along with the select functions. We will see in the refinement type of the select functions how
the policy q helps in attaching the appropriate label to the Tagged monad.
4.2 Select Function
We discussed the data type RefinedFilter which contain the refinements for both
filter property and the policy on the field. The goal is to compute a label over the data which is
selected from the database using the filter and annotate the data with the computed label. The
label on the Tagged monad should be based on the security policy on the field on which the
data was filtered upon.
Figure 4.4 shows the encoding of the function selectTodoItem which takes a
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1 {-@ todoItemSelect1 :: Tagged <{\v -> True}>
2 [TodoItem] @-}
3 todoItemSelect1 :: Tagged [TodoItem]
4 todoItemSelect1 = selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemOwner_EQ 1)
Figure 4.5. An example client code which selects the tasks owned by User with UserId 1.
RefinedFilter defined for TodoItem as input and outputs a list of TodoItems. The function
is parameterized by three predicates, the label p for the output Tagged monad, the security
policy q of accessing the field and the filter condition r. The predicates r and q are instantiated
from the RefinedFilter passed as input and are used to compute the label p. The label p is
computed from the constraint added in line 3 of Figure 4.4. The constraint states that if row is a
TodoItem that satisfies the filter r, then User refined by p is a subtype of the User refined by q
when row is passed as the input to q. We do a subtype here because q is the policy which must
always be satisfied in order to read a row and hence the set of users who are allowed to view the
data should be a sub set of the set of users who were allowed to access the data as described in
the security policy q.
We will discuss how the label for Tagged monad is computed using client code. Fig-
ure 4.5 shows client code which selects TodoItems whose Owner field is equal to 1. The
todoItemSelect1 function selects the TodoItems using filterTodoItemOwner_EQ and passes
the parameter 1 for UserId. The selectTodoItem function takes this RefinedFilter
as input and instatiates the predicate r to \row -> owner row == 1 and predicate q to \
row v -> True. The label p for the Tagged monad is computed based on the constraint
row::TodoItem<r> |- User<p> <: User<q row>. Since row satisfies r, the owner of the
row must be equal to 1. When such a row is passed as input to the policy q, the equation to
compute p becomes User<p> <: User <{\v -> True}>. The predicate p is computed as
\v -> True as LH uses a maximum fix-point solver and hence we get the value p with the
largest possible subtype. Finally, the select function will return a list of TodoItems whose Owner
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1 {-@ projectTask :: forall <r:: TodoItem -> Bool ,
2 p::User ->Bool >.
3 {row::TodoItem <r> |- User <p> <: User <{\v -> Owner row
== UserId v}>}
4 [TodoItem <r>] -> Tagged <p> [String]
5 @-}
6 projectTask :: [TodoItem] -> Tagged [String]
7 projectTask input = Tagged {content = fmap (Task) input}
Figure 4.6. Refinement type of a function which takes a list of TodoItems as inputs and outputs
a list with the Task field of the input
field is set to 1 and attach a policy which allows everyone to access the data inside the monad.
This computed label is correct with the expect label for Tagged described in the refinement
type for todoItemSelect1 and LH verifies it successfully.
The select example discussed above filters on a public field and hence the label associated
with the data allows any viewer to access it. We will now look into how projecting the sensitive
field Task from the selected rows affect the tag associated with the Tagged monad. This is the
same situation as discussed in Figure 2.3.
4.3 Project Function
We discussed the refinement type for the function which selects rows from the database
based on a RefinedFilter . To correctly assign the label to the Tagged monad on sensitive
field accesses, we add a restriction requiring the use of project functions to access a field from
the data retrieved from the database. There can be a security policy attached to the field being
projected and hence we need to update the label of the Tagged monad appropriately. We will
discuss how project functions can be written which enforces the local policies of the field.
Project functions are field specific and hence we need to add a project function for
each field in the database. Figure 4.6 shows the projectTask function which takes a list of
TodoItems as input and outputs a Tagged list of String containing the Task field of the input
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1 {-@ todoProjectTasks1 :: Tagged <{\v -> userId v == 1}>
2 [String] @-}
3 todoProjectTasks1 :: Tagged [String]
4 todoProjectTasks1 = do
5 todoItems <- selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemOwner_EQ 1)
6 projectTask todoItems
Figure 4.7. An example client code which projects the tasks owned by User with UserId 1.
rows. The function defines two predicates, a filter r on TodoItems and a label p. The filter r is
instantiated with the predicate attached to the input list of TodoItem rows.
The label p is computed with respect to the constraint shown on line number 3. It states
that if row satisfies the refinement r (i.e. all of the rows provided as input to projectTask),
User <p> is a subtype of User <{\v -> Owner row == UserId v}>. This constraint re-
stricts the label p to be able to display the data only to the viewer who is the owner of the input
rows and helps in enforcing the local policy P1 for the field Tasks.
Figure 4.7 contains the function todoProjectTask1 which performs both the action
of selecting rows owned by user with UserId 1 from the TodoItem table and projecting out
the Task field. We will discuss how the final label on the output is computed and compare it
with the expected label based on the security policy. The first step of the function selects the
TodoItem by filtering the rows whose Owner is set to 1. This output is stored in the variable
todoItems . This step is the same as the example function discussed in Figure 4.5. We can
see from the previous discussion that todoItems will contains the list of rows filtered from
the table and will bind the label v->True with the output Tagged monad. Now, we use the
data stored in todoItems and pass it to the function projectTask . The predicate r for
projectTask will be instantiated with the predicate r defined by the RefinedFilter
for the selectTodoItem step on line number 5. Hence, the TodoItem row satisfying the
predicate r in line number 3 of Figure 4.6 will have the property Owner row == 1. When
this row is substituted on the right side of the implies statement in the constraint on label p, we
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get User <p> <: User<{\v -> 1 == UserId v}>. LH will infer the type of p as \v ->
UserId v == 1 and hence this would be the label assigned to the output of projectTask. Finally,
we can see that the output of the function is the output of the projectTask call inside the do block,
however, the label on the Tagged of the output for the function will bind the labels computed
at line number 5 and 6 because we used the output of line number 5 to compute the value on
line number 6. The bind function (>>=) will have to compute a new label which is a sub-type of
both \v -> True and \v -> UserId v == 1. The type \v -> UserId v == 1 is a subtype
of both of the input types and hence LH’s maximum fix-point solver will compute this as the
final label on the Tagged monad.
We can see that the refinement type added to the todoProjectTasks1 states the
output to have the label \v-> UserId v == 1 which corresponds to the label computed by us
and hence it is successfully verified by LH. This label also follows policy P1 as it marks the task
projected from the TodoItems owned by user with UserId 1 visible only to them.
4.4 Multiple Filters
We saw the use of abstract refinement over the filters and select functions to compute the
label of the viewer on the data retrieved from the database. The select function is parameterized
by three abstract refinements two of which are instantiated from the RefinedFilter passed
as parameter and are used to compute the label p for Tagged monad. In order to increase the
number of filters which can be used in one select query, we would need to define the predicates
r and q for each of the RefinedFilter . We solve this issue by defining a new data type
FilterList which takes multiple filters and computes a single r and p satisfying each one
of them. This allows us to use the previously defined select and project functions without any
changes.
Figure 4.8 shows the definition of FilterList along with the refinement encoding
of the data type. FilterList has two constructors, Empty and Cons . Empty is the
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1 {-@
2 data FilterList a <r :: a -> Bool ,
3 q :: a -> User -> Bool >. where
4 Empty :: FilterList <{\_-> True}, {\_ _-> True}> a
5 Cons :: forall <r :: a -> Bool ,
6 r1 :: a -> Bool ,
7 r2 :: a -> Bool ,
8 q :: a -> User -> Bool ,
9 q1 :: a -> User -> Bool ,
10 q2 :: a -> User -> Bool >.
11 {a_r1 :: a<r1>, a_r2 :: a<r2> |- {v:a | v ==
a_r1 && v == a_r2} <: a<r>}
12 {row :: a<r> |- User <q row > <: User <q1 row >}
13 {row :: a<r> |- User <q row > <: User <q2 row >}
14 RefinedFilter <r1 , q1> a ->
15 FilterList <r2,q2> a ->
16 FilterList <r,q> a
17 @-}
18 {-@ data variance FilterList covariant
19 covariant contravariant@ -}
20 data FilterList a = Empty
21 | Cons (RefinedFilter a) (FilterList a)
Figure 4.8. Definition of the data type FilterList along with its the refinement encoding.
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FilterList when no filters are added and Cons works like the list constructor cons which
joins a RefinedFilter with the FilterList . The refinement type encoding of the
Empty constructor is set to True for both r and q. This is done because Empty means that
there is no filter used for the select function and hence the complete table would be selected and
the policy should be that it is visible to everyone. This is valid because there was no specific
field on which the data was filtered with. The data will be stored inside the Tagged monad
with label true but any attempt made to access a sensitive field of the database would update the
label accordingly.
The data type FilterList stores multiple RefinedFilter functions using the
Cons constructor and computes a common r and q satisfying all of them. The refinement
encoding of Cons consists of six predicates, three for the filters and three for the policies. The
predicates r1, q1 are instantiated with the RefinedFilter passed as input and r2, q2 are
instantiated with the FilterList to which the input RefinedFilter is being added. The
predicates r and q are computed based on the inputs and are used as the filter and the policy
for the final FilterList . The predicate r is computed using the constraints placed on line
number 11 which states that the set of elements satisfying a<r> should at least contain the
set of common elements satisfying both a<r1 > and a<r2 >. The common policy q for the
FilterList should individually satisfy the policy attached to each RefinedFilter in
the FilterList . The constraints added on line number 12 and 13 are added to compute the
policy q which satisfies both q1 and q2. The first constraint states that if a row satisfies a<r>,
User <q row > should be a sub type of the User <q1 row >. A similar constraint is placed
for q2.
The select function defined previously can now be updated to take FilterList instead
of the RefinedFilter as input and use the predicates r and q attached with the FilterList .
We also define an infix operator ’? :’ which is used to build a FilterList using the Cons
constructor whose definition is shown in figure 4.9.
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1 (?:) :: RefinedFilter a -> FilterList a -> FilterList a
2 f ?: fs = f ‘Cons ‘ fs
Figure 4.9. Definition of the infix operator ?: which takes a RefinedFilter and FilterList and
generates a new FilterList
4.5 Global Policy
In the previous sections we saw the use of refinement types to compute the label for
the Tagged monad based on the the security policies required to view the data inside it. We
focused only on the local policies in the previous section to keep the discussion simple. We will
now extend the encoding to support global policies for different fields.
Global policies depend on more data than the current row being filtered and hence we
need to establish the validity of the extra requirements in the policy. These requirements can
even span over multiple tables and hence it would become a difficult task to verify the policy
for each row individually. We saw in Figure 2.7 that in order to satisfy the policy, the client
code initially retrieved all the requirements and then ran the final query in the database. This
motivated us write encoding to support the global policies in a similar way which requires the
programmers to first retrieve all the requirements from the database.
We handle global policies by attaching various properties to the data being retrieved from
the database and update the refinement types for filters and projection functions to require those
properties. For each global policy, we create a property which is attached to the output of all of
the select functions calls in our API library. We will discuss an example with respect to enforcing
policy P2 in the Todo app which requires viewer v to be able to view the Task field of a row
owned by User u only if there is a row in the the sharedItem table which states that the User u
has shared their tasks with the viewer v.
Figure 4.10 shows the property which is attached to the rows retrieved from the Shared-
Item table. It takes the SharedTo field as its first parameter and SharedFrom field as its second
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1 {-@ measure sharedItemProp :: Int ->Int -> Bool@ -}
Figure 4.10. The measure which is attached to the output of selecting from SharedItem table
1 {-@selectSharedItem :: forall <q :: SharedItem -> User ->
Bool , r :: SharedItem -> Bool , p :: User -> Bool >.
2 {row :: SharedItem <r> |- User <p> <: User <q row >}
3 FilterList <r, q> SharedItem -> Tagged <p> [{v:SharedItem <r
>| sharedItemProp (sharedTo v) (sharedFrom v)}]
4 @-}
Figure 4.11. Updated definition of selectSharedItem which attaches the measure to the output
list
parameter. We further use this to encode the refinement on the output of the select function.
Figure 4.11 shows the updated select function for SharedItem table which takes a FilterList
as input and outputs list of SharedItems. selectSharedItem updates the refined type of out-
put to Tagged<p> [{v:SharedItem<r>| sharedItemProp (sharedTo v)(sharedFrom v
)}] which states that the items of the output list satisfies the predicate r and each element v
of the output satisfies the property sharedItemProp (sharedFrom v)(sharedTo v). This
property will be preserved by LH and can be used to satisfy the policies to filter and project
sensitive fields.
1 {-@
2 projectTasks :: forall <r1::TodoItem -> Bool ,
3 p::User ->Bool >.
4 {row::TodoItem <r1> |- User <p> <: User <{\v -> Owner row
== UserId v || sharedItemProp (UserId v) (Owner row
)}>}
5 xs:[v:TodoItem <r1 >] -> Tagged <p> [String]
6 @-}
Figure 4.12. Updated refinement type of projectTasks function which encodes both policy P1
and policy P2
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Figure 4.12 shows the updated definition of projectTasks function which now
allows it to display the Tasks shared with the viewer. The constraint on User <p> requires it
to be a sub-type of User<{\v -> Owner row == UserId v || sharedItemProp (UserId
v)(Owner row)}>. This either requires the rows to be owned by viewer v or by user u
who satisfies sharedItemProp (UserId v) (UserId u) in order to be displayed to
viewer v. The second disjunct can be satisfied only if the TodoItem rows were filtered by owners
who were retrieved from the SharedItem table whose SharedTo field were set to UserId v.
This allows LH to infer the label p which allows the viewer v to access the data in the Tagged
monad.
We attached the sharedItemProp property to the output of the select function which
contains information about each field of the row. The policies discussed also contained the same
information and hence we were able to infer a proper label for the Tagged monad. There
might be situations where there is extra information in the row which is not needed to enforce
a particular policy. This will lead to an existential constraint which is not supported by LH.
This situation can be handled by creating new properties which contain only the information
required to verify policies instead of one single policy for the complete row of the table. Figure
4.13 shows an example where we are attaching 2 different properties to the output of the select
function from the TodoItem table. These properties can now be individually used in different
policies without having to deal with the existential term.
Chapter 4 is coauthored with Anand, Sourav and Kunkel, Rose. The thesis author was
the primary author of this chapter.
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1 {-@ measure taskOwnerProp :: Int ->String -> Bool@ -}
2 {-@ measure taskDeadlineProp :: String ->Int -> Bool@ -}
3
4 {-@selectTodoItem :: forall <q :: TodoItem -> User -> Bool ,
r :: TodoItem -> Bool , p :: User -> Bool >.
5 {row :: TodoItem <r> |- User <p> <: User <q row >}
6 FilterList <r, q> TodoItem -> Tagged <p> [{v:TodoItem <r>| (
TaskOwnerProp (Owner v) (Task v)) && (taskDeadlineProp
(Task v) (Deadline v)) }]
7 @-}
Figure 4.13. Updated definition of selectTodoItem which attaches multiple measure to the output
list
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
We evaluated our encoding on the Todo application discussed in previous sections. We
modified the model of the database by adding an additional field and security policies. Figure 5.1
shows the updated model of the database along with the annotated security policies which was
used for evaluation.
Our evaluation focused on retrieving data from the database and verifying the visibility
of the data under four different types of viewer consisting of viewer A with UserId 1, viewer
B with UserId 2, visible to everyone and not visible to anyone. We wrote multiple test cases
corresponding to different scenarios where data is retrieved from the database and is passed to
the different display functions. Our display functions are similar to the function shown in Figure
4.1 and have a refinement label for the input Tagged monad corresponding to the type of the
viewer. We verified each of the test case with LH and reported the output as Safe or Unsafe.
5.1 Test Cases
We wrote eight test cases which displays different types of data which was computed
using various queries to the database. All of the test cases retrive data with respect to user A.
The following are the description of the test cases:
T1. Selected TodoItems owned by User A
1 x = selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemOwner_EQ 1 ?: Empty)
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User
UserName UserId
TodoItem
Task Owner
SharedItem
SharedTo SharedFrom
\row v -> UserId v== Owner row || 
                       SharedItem { SharedTo = UserId v, SharedFrom = Owner row}∃
Deadline
\row v -> UserId v== Owner row
\row v -> UserId v== SharedTo row
Figure 5.1. The database model along with the policy annotation for the TodoItem table
Table 5.1. LH output for the different test cases using the four different sets of viewers. Each
output contains the time taken by LH to check the file (in s).
Test Viewer = A Viewer = B Viewer = All Viewer = None
T1 Safe(1.72) Safe(1.82) Safe(1.57) Safe(1.56)
T2 Safe(1.68) Unsafe(1.65) Unsafe(1.67) Safe(1.63)
T3 Safe(1.56) Unsafe(1.88) Unsafe(1.99) Safe(1.58)
T4 Safe(1.52) Safe(1.5) Safe(1.53) Safe(1.56)
T5 Safe(1.62) Unsafe(1.77) Unsafe(1.75) Safe(1.81)
T6 Safe(1.7) Unsafe(2.15) Unsafe(2.39) Safe(1.98)
T7 Safe(2.2) Unsafe(2.57) Unsafe(2.13) Safe(1.97)
T8 Unsafe(2.91) Unsafe(2.54) Unsafe(2.82) Safe(2.46)
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Expected Viewers : All
T2. Projected Task field of TodoItems owned by User A
1 x = do
2 rows <-selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemOwner_EQ 1 ?:
Empty)
3 projectTodoItemTasks rows
Expected Viewers : User A
T3. Projected Deadline field of the TodoItems owned by User A
1 x=do
2 rows <-selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemOwner_EQ 1 ?:
Empty)
3 projectTodoItemDeadline rows
Expected Viewers : User A
T4. Selected SharedItems which are shared to User A
1 x=selectSharedItem (filterSharedItemSharedTo 1 ?:
Empty)
Expected Viewers : All
T5. Projected the SharedFrom field for data selected in T4
1 x =do
2 sharedItems <- selectSharedItem (
filterSharedItemSharedTo 1 ?: Empty)
3 projectSharedItemSharedFrom sharedItems
Expected Viewers : User A
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T6. Used the SharedFrom data from T5 to select TodoItems shared with User A
1 x =do
2 sharedItems <- selectSharedItem (
filterSharedItemSharedTo 1 ?: Empty)
3 sharedFromList <- projectSharedItemSharedFrom
sharedItems
4 selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemowner_In sharedFromList
?: Empty)
Expected Viewers : User A
T7. Projected the Task field from the TodoItems shared with User A (T6)
1 x =do
2 sharedItems <- selectSharedItem (
filterSharedItemSharedTo 1 ?: Empty)
3 sharedFromList <- projectSharedItemSharedFrom
sharedItems
4 todoItems <- selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemowner_In
sharedFromList ?: Empty)
5 projectTodoItemTasks todoItems
Expected Viewers : User A
T8. Projected the Deadline field from the TodoItems shared with User A (T6)
1 x =do
2 sharedItems <- selectSharedItem (
filterSharedItemSharedTo 1 ?: Empty)
3 sharedFromList <- projectSharedItemSharedFrom
sharedItems
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4 todoItems <- selectTodoItem (filterTodoItemowner_In
sharedFromList ?: Empty)
5 projectTodoItemDeadline todoItems
Expected Viewers : None
We show the output of verifying the above test cases using LH in Table 5.1. LH verifies
the label attached to the input Tagged monad with that of the refinement type added to the display
function. Test case T1 and T4 retrieves rows from the database by filtering on a public field
and hence every user is able to view the data. Test cases T2-T3 projects a sensitive field of
rows owned by User A and hence it is visible only to User A. T5-T7 retrieves the data which is
shared with User A and hence the label on the Tagged monad gets updated to allow only User
A to view the data. Finally, test case T8 retrieves the rows shared with User A but projects the
Deadline field of those rows. We can see from the policy on the Deadline field that only owners
are allowed to see the data and hence even User A is unable to view the data. We can see that the
column corresponding to viewer = None is always marked safe. This is expected as no one is
viewing the data retrieved from the database and hence it is always safe to write such code.
The test cases show that the encoding of the refinement types added to the database API
is correctly assigning the labels to the Tagged monad. The client code which was marked as
Unsafe by LH tells the programmer that the display function is trying to display data to a user in
a way which does not follows the security policies of the application. We verified the client code
with respect to just User A but since this is symmetric for each user, we can expect that the API
will be able to correctly assign the labels to the Tagged monads.
5.2 Verification Time
We ran the test cases on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8565U CPU @ 1.80GHz processor with
16 GB RAM. The tests were performed on Windows Subsystem for Linux (Ubuntu). Each of the
timing data reported in this section is an average of 5 runs.
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Table 5.1 shows the time to run individual client code for each test case. These timings
do not include the time to verify the API Library. We can see that the each client code takes
approximately 2-3 seconds to verify.
The time taken to verify the API library is 3.1 seconds. We also measured the time taken
by LH to verify a single file containing multiple client codes. We created this file by copying
all of the client codes which displayed data to User A. The time taken to verify this file is 3.83
seconds.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
We discussed the encoding of refinement types on the database API which allows us to
verify the application with respect to the security policies. The programmers need to label the
displayed functions with policy pertaining to the viewer to whom the data is being displayed and
LH will statically verify if the viewer is allowed to view the data which is being passed as input
to the display function, with respect to the security policies.
We only discussed the refinement types in this thesis and did not discuss the implemen-
tation. We are currently implementing a Yesod application which uses the refinement types in
the Database API. We have completed the implementation of the API which conforms to the
refinement types in Yesod. We are currently working towards implementing the functions in
Yesod which displays the data to the user. We hope to verify the complete application written in
Yesod with respect to the security policies.
We also saw that the API is slightly different than the Yesod examples discussed in
Chapter 2. We had to define separate functions for each action which adds burden onto the
programmer to write the application appropriately. This design decision was taken because of
the limitations of LH. We are also examining other approaches where we can write the functions
in the same way as actual Yesod functions work.
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